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Abstract
By summarizing the research data of urban households in 
S City in China, this thesis mainly studies the impact of 
governmental transition on consumption inequality and 
it finds that government transition have certain impacts 
on social inequality. Government role, in the process of 
transiting gradually from the economic construction-
oriented government to service-oriented government, 
has increased spending on education, health, social 
security and other public welfares. Relative fairness in 
education and health spending among different units of 
the system helps to narrow the gap of social inequality. 
However, spending on social security did not play the 
role of reducing inequality through redistribution, but has 
exacerbated the social inequality. 
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1.  BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS
China’s market-oriented reform is a process of bilateral 
interaction between the state and market (Zhou, 2000). 
Since the reform, the government role has been in a 
gradual transition from the economic construction-oriented 
government to service-oriented government. Since the 
1990s, many a researches and summaries have been done 
on the transition of the government role by the academic 
field (Lin, 1995; Oi, 1995; Walder, 1995). Because of 
the influence of the traditional planned economy system, 
the government has been in a leading position and has 
showed its powerful strength in the process of China’s 
economic and social development. The government 
role has a significant influence on social inequality 
(Xie, 2010). In the process of social transformation, 
the government’s function is mainly manifested in two 
aspects: first, the government guides the modern society 
transition from agricultural society to industrial society, 
from planned economy to market economy; second, 
the government realizes its transition according to the 
demand of the economic and social development (Shen 
& Ma, 2008). In the process, great changes have taken 
place in the role of government, gradually shifting from 
the “economic construction-oriented government”, who 
directly participate in economic production activities to 
the “service-oriented government”, who provides effective 
social public goods and public services.
Faced with the reality of beneficial decline in state-
owned enterprises, and in order to realize the goal of 
economic growth, the government, in the middle of 1990s, 
promoted the reform of state-owned enterprises to improve 
the efficiency of economic operation, on the other hand, 
actively promoted the development of the non-public 
economy. The reform of state-owned enterprises led to a 
sharp drop in the quantity of state-owned enterprises and 
their employees, and the traditional planned economy 
began to decline (Liu, Wang & Zhang, 2008). There 
emerged a large number of laid-off workers in cities. With 
the development of the non-public economy, the proportion 
of employment personnel in state-owned and collective 
units showed a big drop among all the employees, from 
99.2% in 1980 to 20.5% in 2009. Cai (2010) studies have 
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shown that these changes will lead to the rise of social 
inequality. By using the CHIP data to analyze the unequal 
relationship between the reform of state-owned enterprises 
and cities, Meng (2004) found reconstruction of state-
owned enterprises is the the main influence factors of city 
rise in inequality in 1995-1999.
The government transition is mainly manifested on 
government spending and its structure changes. Economic 
construction-oriented government’s fiscal spending 
is mainly used for economic construction and the 
government administrative expenses, while public-service-
oriented government increased the investigation on 
education, health, social security and other public welfare. 
With the improvement of the national economy, people 
have higher and higher demanding to the public welfare, 
which inevitably requires the government to play a more 
important role. Due to the rigidity of public welfare, 
the social members have an increasing requirement to 
government for the welfare, so the government will 
continue to expand the scale of government to increase 
the public welfare supply ability (Zhang, 2004). But 
there are still debates over whether scale of government 
and expansion of fiscal expenditure will reduce social 
inequality in practice. It is difficult to say whether it is 
appropriate for a certain public expenditure scale, and 
whether it helps to narrow the social inequality gap due to 
the local government officials’ own interests, such as their 
promotion, etc.. Expansion of government power made 
the mode of allocation from “market-oriented” to “power-
oriented”, which led to the widening of social inequality. 
Chong and Liu (Liu, 2008) studies’ on China’s rural areas 
showed the expansion of government spending, while 
effectively suppresses the poorer rural income inequality, 
but generally exacerbated the rural income inequality. Cai 
approved that the scale of government and spending has 
no effect on urban social inequality with a survey, which 
is from the national bureau of statistics urban household 
from 1992 to 2003.
Social security and other public welfare investment are 
modification and supplement to the primary distribution 
results done by the government, the purpose of which is 
to reduce social inequality. But public goods providers 
(the government) are not ultimately bear of public 
product cost; as a result, it is easy to cause the emergence 
of soft budget constraint. Cole Nye argues that the 
public enterprises under the socialist system just blindly 
pursue output in economic activity, but don’t emphasize 
efficiency, so “budget” cannot effectively restrain the 
enterprise (Kornai, 1979). There is a similar phenomenon 
in the government’s spending on public welfare, that is, 
the government budget cannot form a strong constraint on 
the government behavior. On the contrary, the government 
will pursue maximum industrial scale of the public 
product, but not consider minimizing the cost in order to 
show off the achievements and earn more supports. In 
the long run, this will lead to the waste of public product 
supply, and damage efficiency. Therefore, the investment 
of public welfare would not have the effect to narrow the 
gap of social inequality if there is a soft budget constraint. 
According to the above analysis, we assume that:
Hypothesis 1: A decreasing employment proportion 
of the state-owned units will cause the rise of social 
inequality.
Hypothesis 2: The expanding scale of government 
helps to reduce income inequality.
Hypothesis 3a: An increase on public welfare 
investment will help reduce social inequality.
Hypothesis 3b: If there is a soft budget constraint, an 
increase on public welfare investment, will not reduce 
social inequality.
2.  DATA, VARIABLES, AND MODELS
2.1  Data
The data of this thesis came from the national bureau 
and it is the survey on households in S city, including 22 
years’ original data from 1988 to 2009. This survey uses 
stratified, multi-stage, and probability proportional of size 
(PPS) random isometric methods to select samples, and 
there are 6,203 valid samples. The survey content includes 
the basic information of family members and family, 
family income and consumption expenditure, etc., among 
all these, personal basic situation, income and social 
security expenditure is collected by an individual unit, 
and consumption is done by a family unit. This thesis is 
to testify the above hypothesis through data summary and 
generation time series.
2.2  Variables
2.2.1  Dependent Variable
Dependent variable here is social inequality, measured by 
the Gini coefficient of annual consumption spending. 
2.2.2  Independent Variable
a. The unit’s system, which is measured by the ratio 
of employment personnel in the state-owned enterprises 
in this sample. Throughout calculation, the employment 
proportion in state-owned enterprises showed a trend of 
gradual decline, with an average rate of 0.63, a minimum 
rate of 0.21, and a maximum rate of 0.92. 
b. The scale of government, which is measured by 
proportion of government spending in the GDP. Through 
calculation, the proportion of government spending in 
GDP has dropped since 1994, and to the lowest in 2004. 
Afterwards, it gradually increases, with an average rate of 
0.12, a minimum rate of 0.09, and a maximum rate of 0.15.
c. Public welfare spending, whose level is measured 
by its proportion in the state fiscal expenditure, including 
per capita spending on education and health, and social 
security in each year. This thesis has made logarithmic 
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procession on per capita spending on education, 
health and social security in order to eliminate the 
heteroscedasticity of time sequences.
2.3  Model
2.3.1  Prais Model
This  mode l  r ev i ses  the  ex i s t ing  f i r s t -o rde r 
autoregressive errors by using generalized least squares 
(Prais & Winsten, 1954). The model is as follows:
             Yt = βXt + μt  （1）
             μt=ρμt-1 +εt  （2）
Yt is the value when the consumption of Gini 
coefficient of the dependent vibrant is t, Xt is the 
disturbance vestor, the matrix of the independent variable 
values, and μt is disturbance vector, ρ is the first-order 
autocorrelation parameter.
2.3.2  Granger Causality Test
This test explains that, in a vector autoregressive model, 
variables do not include any of the current variable, but 
being the lag item of explanation variable, so as to test 
whether the planned economy, government scale and 
public welfare spending is the granger cause of the change 
of the Gini coefficient.
3.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
3.1  Results of Prais Model Regression
The values of three models of Durbin - Watson were 
1.95, 1.78 and 1.95, respectively, and the test showed that 
after model fitting, there were no significant first-order 
autocorrelation left behind. The result of Model 1 shows 
that the decrease of proportion of personnel in state-
owned enterprises will make the Gini coefficient uplifting, 
which is in accordance with the research theory of Cai 
and Meng. The expansion of government scale decreased 
the Gini coefficient. After applying the per capita social 
security expenditure and per capita education, health 
expenditure into Model 2, employment proportion of 
state-owned enterprises do not have significant impacts 
on the Gini coefficient, which shows the main influence 
of planned economy on Gini coefficient being that the 
different share of per person social security expenditure 
and per person education, health expenditure. When per 
capita social security expenditure and per capita education 
health expenditure, employment proportion of state-
owned enterprises has no impact on the Gini coefficient. 
Based of model 1, the social security expenditure 
proportion and the proportion of education and health 
spending were added to Model 3. But these two variables 
have no significant influence on the Gini coefficient, while 
the planned economy still has a significant effect on the 
Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is in growth with the 
decline of the state-owned enterprise employment.
Table 1
Prais Model Result of Gini Coefficient
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Proportion of employees in state-owned enterprises
-0.171*** -0.017 -0.111**
(0.013) (0.038) (0.041)
Government scale
-1.022*** -0.648** -0.947***
(0.266) (0.225) (0.259)
Logarithm of per person’s social security expenditure
0.066***
(0.016)
Logarithm of per person’s education and health expenditure
-0.043***
(0.012)
Proportion of social security expenditure
3.410
(2.345)
Proportion of education and health expenditure
0.088
(0.198)
Constant 
0.519*** 0.415*** 0.432***
(0.033) (0.050) (0.071)
Durbin-Watson 1.95 1.78 1.89
Adjusted R2 0.897 0.937 0.915
F 97.419 109.445 60.873
Note. The figures in parentheses are standard errors, * p < 0.1, * *p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests).
The above results show that the assumption 1 is not 
fully supported. In order to promote economic growth and 
efficiency, the government made state-owned enterprises 
employment population fell sharply, through restructuring 
and reorganization of state-owned enterprises and 
encouraging the development of non-public economy, 
which increased social inequality, which was not affected 
significantly when the government controlled the per 
capita expenditure on social security, education and health. 
The planned economy is still the important mechanism of 
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social inequality, but in the process of marketization and 
institutional transformation, larger changes has happened 
on the ways to influence the social inequality. Before 
reform and opening up, the enterprise determines all 
aspects of the individual’s daily life, political life, work, 
etc. In the early stage of marketization, urban residents are 
still arranged by country and unit housing and jobs, etc. 
(Xie, 2010). With the advancement of marketization and 
government transformation, the influence of enterprise 
system on the social inequality is mainly caused by the 
large differences in rights to share the public welfare 
between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. 
The expansion of government’s scale helps reduce social 
inequality, and hypothesis 2 is true, which suggests that 
the government still plays a leading role in the economic 
and social development. Theoretically, the increase of 
public welfare investment helps reduce inequality, but 
assumption 3a is not fully supported. The increasing per 
capita spending in education and health reduced social 
inequality, which showed that urban residents enjoy a 
relatively fair share to education and health resources. But 
social security did not play the role to reduce inequality by 
redistribution; instead, it has exacerbated social inequality. 
Hypothesis 3b is true. There is soft budget constrain of 
the government spending on public welfare. Although the 
scale of supply is expanding, it didn’t play effective role 
at all. The status China’s “strong government” made the 
public welfare in a power-oriented distribution, which has 
great difference in different groups, and thus, exacerbated 
the social inequality.
3.2  Granger Causality Test
Based on the vector autoregressive model, this thesis 
adopts Granger causality tests to determine whether 
there is a causal relationship between variables and Gini 
coefficient, with the lag order number being 1. Table 2 and 
Table 3 are respectively the Granger causality test results 
added with per capita expenditure on social security 
as well as on education and health, and expenditure 
proportion on social security as well as on education. 
Test results show that, under the level of 0.1, the scale of 
government, per capita social security expenditure, per 
capita education and health spending are the granger cause 
of the Gini coefficient, and the lag value of the above 
variable has a significant effect on the Gini coefficient. 
Expenditure proportion on social security and that on 
education are not the granger reason of Gini coefficient. 
The proportion of state-owned enterprises employment 
is not the granger reason of the Gini coefficient when per 
capita expenditure on social security, education and health 
is being controlled. However, it is the Granger that works 
when proportion expenditure on social security, education 
and health is under control.
Table 2 
Granger Causality Test of the Gini Coefficient in the 
Vector Autoregressive Model
Variable X2 DF P 
Proportion of employees 
in state-owned enterprises
0.737 1 0.391
Government Scale 4.952 1 0.026
Per person’s social welfare 
expenditure
4.984 1 0.026
Per person’s education & 
health expenditure
6.959 1 0.008
Table 3
Granger Causality Test of the Gini Coefficient in the 
Vector Autoregressive Model
Variable X2 DF P 
Proportion of employees in 
state-owned enterprises 6.208 1 0.013
Government scale 3.540 1 0.060
Per person’s social welfare 
expenditure 9.1x10
-5 1 0.992
Per person’s education & 
health expenditure 0.188 1 0.664
CONCLUSION
The government transition had certain influence on 
social inequality. In the gradual process of transiting 
from “economic construction-oriented government” to 
“service-oriented” government, the government increased 
expenditures on education and health, social security 
and other public welfare. Relatively fair expenditures 
on education and health among different unit systems, 
contribute to reducing social inequality. But spending on 
social security did not play a role to reduce inequality 
by redistribution, instead intensified social inequality. 
Considering the soft budget constraint of public welfare 
spending, the role of government in social security shall 
be restored to promote social justice. The government’s 
important responsibility is to reduce inequality through 
redistribution. Therefore, the government should not only 
increase the investment of public welfare, but also need 
to evaluate the efficiency and effect of public welfare 
investment in the process of transition from “economic 
construction-oriented” government to “public service-
oriented” government, in order to realize the equalization 
of public services. 
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